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Abstract
Interest rate risk is a major concern for banks because of the nominal nature of
their assets and the asset-liability maturity mismatch. This paper proposes a new
way to derive a bank’s interest rate sensitivity, by examining separately the effects
of interest rate changes on existing loans (loans-in-place) and potential loans
(loans-in-process). A potential loan is shown to be equivalent to an American
option to lend, and is valued using option theory. An increase in interest rates
usually has a negative effect on existing loans. However, if both deposit and
lending rates rise by the same amount, the value of a potential loan generally
increases. Hence a bank’s lending slack (ratio of loans-in-process to loans-in-
place) will determine its overall interest rate risk. Empirical evidence indicates
that low-slack banks indeed have significantly more interest rate risk than high-
slack banks. The model also makes predictions regarding the effect of deposit and
lending rate parameters on bank credit availability. Empirical tests with quarterly
data are generally supportive of these predictions.
Key words: interest rate risk, option to lend, bank’s lending capacity, maturity
intermediation
JEL classification numbers: G21, G134
Pankkien lainaoptiot, korkoherkkyys ja
luoton saatavuus
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 15/2002
Iftekhar Hasan – Sudipto Sarkar
Tutkimusosasto
Tiivistelmä
Pankeilla on merkittäviä korkoriskejä, jotka johtuvat niiden velkojen ja saamisten
nimellisyydestä ja maturiteettierosta. Tässä tutkimuksessa esitetään uusi tapa ar-
vioida pankkien korkoherkkyyttä tarkastelemalla erikseen korkomuutosten vaiku-
tuksia vanhoihin lainoihin ja potentiaalisiin uusiin lainoihin. Potentiaalisen uuden
lainan osoitetaan vastaavan amerikkalaista luotonanto-optiota, joten sen arvo voi-
daan johtaa optioteorian avulla. Korkojen nousulla on yleisesti negatiivinen vaiku-
tus vanhojen lainojen arvoon. Jos sitä vastoin talletus- ja luottokorot vaihtelevat
yhdessä, potentiaalisen uuden lainan arvo yleensä nousee koron myötä. Näin ollen
pankin luotonantovara eli potentiaalisten uusien lainojen määrän suhde vanhaan
lainakantaan määrää sen korkoriskin. Empiiristen tulosten mukaan korkoriski
sellaisilla pankkeilla, joiden luotonantovara on pieni, on merkittävästi suurempi
kuin pankeilla, joilla on paljon käyttämätöntä luotonantovaraa. Mallin avulla voi-
daan myös ennustaa luotto- ja talletuskorkojen vaikutuksia luoton saatavuuteen.
Neljännesvuosiaineistolla saadut empiiriset tulokset yleisesti tukevat mallin en-
nusteita.
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1 Introduction
Banks are different from other commercial firms in that they produce financial
services, the reward to which is an interest rate, and most of their operations are
financed by borrowings, the cost of which is also an interest rate. Banks are
therefore more sensitive to interest rate fluctuations than most other businesses.
The effect of interest rate changes on bank profits and values has been an
important issue for the banking industry in recent years. It has been argued that
banks’ exposure to interest rate risk was perhaps the most important factor in
precipitating the U.S. savings and loans crisis (Duan, et al (1995)). Whether
higher market interest rates hurt or benefit banks will have crucial implications for
monetary policy and government regulation of interest rates. Moreover, regulators
in the banking industry are interested in the relationship between bank risk and the
insurance liabilities of the FDIC, and interest rate risk exposure is one of the
factors examined when determining a bank’s capital adequacy situation.
To date, there is no consensus on whether higher interest rates hurt or help the
banking industry. In fact, whether banks are at all sensitive to changes in interest
rates is an unresolved issue. Samuelson (1945) argued that banks should benefit
from rising interest rates, but empirical studies provide mixed results on this issue.
While some have found no significant effect of interest rate changes on bank
profitability or stock returns (Flannery (1981, 1983) and Chance & Lane (1980)),
others have found that higher interest rates help banks (Hanweck & Kilcollin
(1984) and Hancock (1985)), and still others have found that higher interest rates
hurt banks (Booth & Officer (1985), Flannery & James (1984a) and Lynge &
Zumwalt (1980)). Scott & Peterson (1986) found that equity values of unhedged
S&L associations were more sensitive to unexpected interest rate changes than
commercial banks and insurance companies, which more closely balance the
maturities of their assets and liabilities. Importantly, bank stocks have been found
to be significantly more sensitive to interest rate changes than industrial stocks
(Lynge & Zumwalt (1980)).
The traditional theoretical approach has been to view the bank as a maturity
intermediary which borrows short and lends long; thus its assets are long-maturity
and liabilities are short-maturity. In case of an interest rate change, the effects on
the assets and liabilities are computed, from which the net effect is derived. This
has led to the concept of gap management, where the maturity/duration gap is the
control variable in interest rate risk management (chapter 5 of Saunders (1994)).
While this approach may be adequate for measuring the effect of interest rate
changes on the existing loan portfolio, it is not appropriate for the bank as a
whole. This is because it ignores an important source of value for a bank: the
ability to make additional loans at positive spreads between loan and deposit rates.
Positive spreads between borrowing and lending rates survive in equilibrium to8
reward banks for interest rate risk, among others (Kane (1981)). This “ability to
lend at a positive spread” in the future comes from the bank’s special status as a
financial institution, expertise in the area, specialized skills of its employees, etc.
It is similar to the concept of “value as a going concern” (Samuelson (1945)) or
“rent” (Hutchison & Pennacchi (1996)). Although this aspect has been largely
ignored in the existing literature, it is necessary to examine the valuation effects of
this “ability to lend” in order to properly evaluate the effect of interest rate
changes. This is what our article attempts.
1.1 Valuing the “Ability to lend”
The bank has, by virtue of its position, the ability to lend money at a certain rate
(say L%) and finance it by taking deposits at the deposit rate (say r%). With
positive spreads (L – r), this ability contributes to bank value. If the spread is large
enough, the bank will grant the loan immediately. If, on the other hand, the spread
is narrow (or zero, or even negative), the bank will postpone granting the loan.
We can recognize the correspondence between the ability to make a loan and an
American option. Once the option to lend is exercised, the payoff is the spread
over the life of the loan, ie, once the option is exercised, the option to lend is
replaced by the loan itself. We can therefore use option theory to value the ability
to lend, and study the overall effect of interest rate changes on bank values. This
is the main contribution of our paper. Hutchison & Pennacchi (1996) also
incorporate the value of future stream of profits from loans and deposits.
However, in their model, the loan rate is set competitively and the deposit market
is monopolistic where the bank chooses the deposit rate (and corresponding
quantity) optimally; whereas in our model, the bank is a price-taker
1 in both loan
and deposit markets (the rates being determined by the markets) and the bank
decides whether or not to make the loan at the market rates, ie, the bank acts
optimally in timing its loans/deposits.
1.2 Our approach
We examine the effect of interest rate risk on the net value of the bank’s loan
portfolio (existing and potential), since this is basically the means by which
                                                
1 The “ability to lend at a positive spread” and banks being “price-takers” are consistent because
(i) banks are “special” in lending because of the special position they occupy, from which they
derive “rents” (Hutchison & Pennacchi (1996)); and (ii) banks take interest rate risk, for which the
reward is the risk premium (higher loan rate) or the return to maturity intermediation. We thank
the referee for pointing this out.9
interest rate effects are transmitted to bank equity values. There are two points to
note about our approach: (1) First, we make a distinction between the deposit rate
or bank’s cost of funds (which we call the short-term rate rt) and the loan rate or
bank’s revenue (which we call the long-term rate Lt). This allows us to capture an
essential feature of banks, ie, the mismatch between asset and liability maturities.
The long rate is in general different from the short rate, although they tend to
move together and are positively correlated. Hence the two rates are modelled as
separate (possibly correlated) processes. (2) Second, we treat an existing loan
differently from a potential loan. The former is termed a “loan-in-place” and the
latter a “loan-in-process.” For the former, the loan rate remains unchanged when
interest rates change, whereas deposits (being short-term) are continuously
renewed; therefore, interest rate changes will affect costs but not revenues. For a
loan-in-process, interest rate changes will affect both revenues and cost, hence its
valuation effects will differ from that of a loan-in-place.
It is obvious that, for a loan-in-place, the bank will be hurt by a rise in interest
rates, since revenues will be unchanged but costs will rise. For a loan-in-process, a
rise in interest rates will be reflected in the potential lending rate. Thus the effect
of interest rate changes on a loan-in-process might be very different from the
effect on a loan-in-place. As shown in this paper, a loan-in-process is equivalent
to an option to lend,
2 and once the option is exercised, a loan-in-process becomes
a loan-in-place. Therefore, option pricing techniques can be used to value a loan-
in-process and gauge the effect of interest rate changes. This allows us to include
the role of both existing loans and potential loans, when examining the net effect
of interest rate risk on a bank’s value.
                                                
2 This is different from the conventional exchange-traded option. It is analogous to a “real option”
(Dixit & Pindyck (1994)). In a partial-equilibrium setting, where both the loan and deposit rates
are market-determined (and therefore exogenous for the bank), the bank’s ability to grant loans
when conditions are favorable and to withhold loans when conditions are unfavorable is similar to
an American option. Since this option has real value, it has to be taken into account. The value
comes from the bank’s special position as a recognized financial institution that can accept
deposits and lend the money at higher rates. It is well known in the real options literature that such
options have positive values in equilibrium if there are barriers to entry, and there are significant
barriers to establishing a bank. The set-up costs incurred in incorporating as a bank can be viewed
as the price paid for the implicit option. Borrowers also have the option to borrow, but this option
has zero value in equilibrium because there are no significant barriers to entry. The equilibrium or
market-clearing loan rate is, however, affected by borrowers: if the loan rate is too high, they will
not borrow, as a result of which L will fall to the appropriate level at which markets clear. At this
level, the option to borrow will have zero value.10
1.3 Maturity intermediation
A bank has many roles, eg, brokerage function, asset transformation, and maturity
intermediation (Saunders (1994)). Of these, maturity intermediation is arguably
the most important function of a bank, particularly in the context of interest rate
risk. To quote McCulloch (1981), page 223, “… interest rate risk is particularly
interesting in view of the traditional practice followed by financial intermediaries
of ‘transforming maturities’ by borrowing short and lending long.” For
commercial banks and thrifts, the average maturity for assets is longer than that
for liabilities, since they tend to hold large amounts of relatively long-term fixed-
income assets such as loans and conventional mortgages, while issuing shorter-
term liabilities such as certificates of deposit. A classic recent illustration of the
effects of this maturity mismatch is the S&L disaster (Duan, et al (1995)).
Recently, there have been attempts by banks to reduce their maturity
intermediation role by matching the maturities of assets and liabilities, especially
after the S&L crisis. In spite of these efforts, “… all financial institutions tend to
mismatch their balance sheet maturities to some degree” (Saunders (1994), page
86).
In this paper, we focus on this particular role of banks: maturity
intermediation. The bank borrows short and lends long,
3 and its primary function
is to match the maturities of short-term lenders and long-term borrowers. The
reward to this intermediation is the spread $(L – r) per dollar of intermediation,
where r = short-term (deposit) rate, and L = long-term (lending) rate.
Suppose that at time t = 0, a bank makes a $1 T-period loan at a (fixed)
lending rate of L0. Then it will receive a constant cash flow stream of $L0 per unit
time till the loan matures at t = T. In order to finance the loan, it borrows $1 from
short-term depositors whom it pays at the rate of $rt per unit time. Since this is the
short-term rate, it changes continuously. If the bank’s role is reduced to this bare
function, the cash flow can be viewed as the spread between the fixed return from
the loan and the variable cost of funds, ie, $(L0 – rt) per unit time per dollar
intermediated, till the loan matures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the
model, value a loan-in-place, and use the option pricing methodology to value a
                                                
3 This is equivalent to saying that its liabilities are short-term and assets long-term, a fairly
accurate characterization for most banks. Although banks have (infinite-maturity) equity in the
balance sheet, the equity/assets ratio for banks is generally much smaller than other firms. For
instance, the ratio was 6.68% for the banking sector as a whole in 1991 (Saunders (1994)); thus,
over 93% of total bank assets were funded by deposits or borrowed funds. Of these, deposits far
outweighed the rest, accounting for $2.48 trillion against $0.49 and $0.34 trillion respectively for
borrowings and other liabilities. On the assets side, the most important component is loans (other
assets include securities held as investments, such as treasury bonds, municipal bonds, and high-
grade corporate bonds). Bank assets therefore have longer maturities than bank liabilities.11
loan-in-process. Section 3 presents the numerical analysis and comparative statics:
we show that the value of a loan-in-place decreases when interest rates rise, and
the value of a loan-in-process rises when both lending rate and deposit rate rise by
the same amount. Section 4 examines the overall impact of interest rate risk on a
bank, and shows its relation to the lending slack maintained by the bank. It also
examines the critical lending trigger and its role in credit availability. Finally,
Section 4 includes some empirical tests of the model’s implications; the results are




– The bank is a pure maturity intermediary; that is, it borrows short and lends
long and in the process, is subject to interest rate risk
– There is no default risk. Although default risk is undoubtedly important for
banks, our focus is on the pure effect of interest rate risk
4
– The bank borrows money from depositors at the (variable) short rate rt and
lends to businesses at the (fixed) long rate L.
5 Both the rates are exogenously
determined by the market, and follow random processes described below; the
bank is thus a price-taker in both the loan and the deposit markets, as in Pyle
(1971) and Jaffee (1986). While this implies perfect competition and lack of
market power (which might not be completely true in real life), it is a
reasonably good characterization of the way banks behave (Jaffee (1986)).
– It is by now well-established that interest rates generally follow a mean-
reverting stochastic process (Campbell & Shiller (1984), Cox, Ingersoll &
Ross or CIR (1985), etc). Therefore, we assume two separate (but possibly
                                                
4 In fact, the pure effect of interest rate risk is a starting point in examining the combined effect of
interest rate risk and default risk and the interactions between them. Duan, et al (1995), for
instance, have derived an expression for interest rate elasticity of bank asset value, v, which is a
constant, with the objective of relating bank risk to insurer’s risk. Our paper, on the other hand,
focuses on this one aspect (v), and we find that v is not necessarily constant; also, it can be
positive or negative, large or small, depending on the bank’s lending position.
5 The assumption that all loans are fixed-rate may be unrealistic since most banks do make some
floating-rate loans today. What is necessary for our results, however, is that some loans be fixed-
rate, not necessarily all. Floating-rate loans by their very nature are not subject to significant
interest rate risk, hence they will not make a significant contribution to any effects of interest rate
changes on bank values. Therefore, any interest rate risk should come via the fixed-rate loans,
which is what this paper examines.12
correlated) mean-reverting square-root stochastic processes (as in CIR) for the
short-term and long-term interest rates,
6 as follows:
1 dz r + dt ) r ( = dr     (1)
2 dz L + dt ) L ( = dL     (2)
where r and L denote the short and long rates respectively,  and  the speeds of
adjustment of the short and long rates,  and  the long-run mean values of the
two processes,  and  the volatilities of the two processes, and z1 & z2 are two
standard Brownian Motion Processes which are possibly correlated.
7 Let the
correlation coefficient be given by , ie
dt dz dz 2 1   (3)
– For ease of exposition, we look at only two maturities, long and short;
although in real life there may be many possible maturities
– We ignore operating costs, and the only cash flows in the model are those
related to the loan, ie, cash outflow to depositors and cash inflow from
borrowers. While operating costs certainly affect the bank's bottom line, they
are largely unrelated to interest rate changes and therefore not relevant here.
– When the bank makes a unit loan
8 (a $1 loan), ie, when the option to lend is
exercised, it instantaneously raises $1 (by taking in an additional dollar in
deposits) and lends the same amount to the borrower. The loan rate will be
fixed at L0 (since the loan is granted at t = 0) till the loan matures. However,
the deposit rate rt will vary continuously as in equation (1).
Our model is cast in a partial equilibrium setting with two exogenously specified
state variables r and L. The bank takes these rates as given, and has no control
over their determination. In a more complete general equilibrium model, banks
would, through competition and optimizing behavior in their loan decisions,
                                                
6 To be more precise, equations (1) and (2) describe the risk-adjusted stochastic processes, or the
processes under the risk-neutral martingale measure (Duffie (1992), chapter 7). Therefore, for
valuation purposes, all we need to do is to compute the expected present value of cash flows.
7 This is similar to the two-factor term structure model of Brennan & Schwartz (1979 and 1982)
that has two stochastic state variables, the short rate and the long rate (or the “consol” rate).
8 We are considering the valuation effects on a unit loan. As for the total amount the bank can
lend, the upper limit on lending (and borrowing, since loans are financed by borrowings) is set by
regulatory constraints such as the capital adequacy requirement. The bank can borrow (at rate r)
and lend (at rate L) till the limit is reached. This is similar to Crouhy and Galai’s (1991)
assumption: “In a competitive market, however, each bank is a rate-taker rather than a rate-setter.
Hence, any quantity of deposits can be obtained at the ‘right’ price.”13
certainly influence the long-term rate. Our paper, however, models it from the
perspective of an individual competitive bank, which by itself has no influence on
the interest rate processes, and takes them as exogenously specified.
The deposit contract is essentially a unit deposit, ie, a $1 deposit that is
similar to a floating-rate coupon bond, with the depositor receiving a continuous
stream of cash flow $rt per unit time. It is like any coupon-bearing bond in
continuous-time models, except that the coupon is stochastic. The deposit contract
is a short-term one, the underlying assumption being that it matures
instantaneously and is continuously rolled over. However, if the depositor wishes
to withdraw at any time, the bank can get the $1 from another depositor. The bank
borrows $1 to finance a unit (or $1) loan [we ignore equity since most of the
operations of banks are financed by deposits]. The dollar amount is just a
normalization, and does not represent an optimal strategy by the bank. The
optimal strategy comes in choosing when to extend the loans, and the deposit
(borrowing) policy follows from that. As stated above, equity funding of short-
term shortfalls is not allowed in the model since all future loans will be financed
by deposits. Finally, there is no renegotiation of loan rates, which remain fixed till
maturity.
2.2 Valuation of a loan-in-place
Let us look at a unit T-year loan. If the bank makes the loan today (at time t = 0),
then it locks in a fixed cash inflow of $L0 per unit time from t = 0 to t = T. To
finance this loan, the bank borrows $1 from depositors, but since the depositors
are short-term lenders the deposit has to be continuously rolled over. The resulting
(stochastic) cash outflow is $rt per unit time from t = 0 to t = T. The Value of the
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or
                                                
9 Note that equation (4) is similar to Flannery’s (1981, equation 1) representation of the value of a
bank loan, with the difference being that we use the stochastic short-term rate as both the discount
rate as well as the bank’s cost of funds. Thus, we have two state variables (loan and deposit rates)
while Flannery’s model has three. In a stochastic interest rate environment with negligible default
risk, with continuous discounting and compounding, we feel that the appropriate discount rate is
the stochastic short-term rate. Our model could be extended to include a discount rate process
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where D0(t) = value at time 0 of $1 to be received at time t (or the current value of
a unit discount bond maturing at time t). As shown in Cox, Ingersoll and Ross
(1985), D0(t) is given by
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The first term on the right hand side of equation (5) denotes the value of a
constant cash flow stream of L0 per unit time from t = 0 to t = T; this has to be
evaluated by numerical integration. The second term denotes the value of a
continuous payment of rt per unit time from t = 0 to t = T. We know that a bond
paying a continuous coupon of $rt per unit time from time t = 0 to t = T, as well as
$1 at t = T, has an expected value of $1. Thus
(T) D 1   =   T   at time   received   be    to $1   of   Value     1   = dt  (t) D r E 0 0 t
T
0
   (10)15
Therefore, the value of making a T-period loan now (at t = 0) is:
10
e A(T) + 1 dt e A(t) L = ) r , L EPV(
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More generally, the value of granting a T-period loan at time t is:
e A(T) + 1 ds e A(s) L = ) r , L EPV(




t t     (12)
Now consider an existing loan (granted when the long rate was Lex) with
remaining time to maturity of Trem. Then the value of the loan to the bank at time
t = 0 is:
e ) T A( + 1 dt e A(t) L = ) r , L EPV(








    (13)
2.3 Valuation of loan-in-process
We have seen that a loan-in-process is equivalent to an option to grant the loan
(ie, a call option on a bond), hence it can be valued as an American option to buy
a bond. The option value will depend on the two state variables Lt and rt, as well
as the calendar time t; let us therefore denote it V(L,r,t). As shown in Appendix 1,
V(L,r,t) must satisfy the following partial differential equation:
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(14)
                                                
10 Note, however, that the bank’s NPV from the deposit contract itself is zero. The depositor pays
the bank $1 at time t = 0, the deposit matures instantaneously and is continuously rolled over till
time T, at which time the $1 is returned to the depositor. During the period from t = 0 to t = T, the
depositor receives the stochastic coupon stream $rt per unit time. Thus the cash flows to the bank
are: +$1 at time t = 0, –$rt per unit time from t = 0 to t = T, and –$1 at time t = T. When the
deposit is made at time t = 0, the bank’s NPV for the deposit contract is given by:
) T ( D dt ) t ( D r E 1 NPV 0 0
T
0
t 0      . From equation (10), we can see that
) T ( D 1 dt ) t ( D r E 0 0
T
0
t 0    . Thus the bank’s NPV with respect to the deposit contract is given by
1–[1–D0(T)]–D0(T) = 0. We thank an anonymous referee for clarifying this point.16
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. In addition, a number of other
conditions must be satisfied by V(L,r,t), as discussed below.
Let the option to grant the loan expire at time T
* (the time to expiration is
discussed in more detail in Section 3). At expiry, the option should optimally be
exercised if it is in the money, giving the terminal condition:
r) (L,     r),0}, Max{EPV(L, = ) T r, V(L,
*  (15)
When r is very low (approaches zero), the option will be exercised for sure, if in
the money. This gives the lower boundary condition:
t) (L,     0),0}, Max{EPV(L, = t) V(L,0,  (16)
On the other hand, when r approaches infinity, it is unlikely that the loan will be
granted at all, hence the option value approaches zero:
t) (L,     0, = t) r, V(L, Lim
r 
  (17)
Similarly, when L approaches zero, the option value will also approach zero:
t) (r,     0, = t) r, V(0,  (18)
When L approaches infinity, the option will be exercised for sure, if it is in the
money:
t) (r,     r),0], Max[EPV(L, = t) r, V(L, Lim
L 
  (19)
Next consider the optimal exercise of the American option to grant a loan. From
equation (12), it is clear that the option will be exercised when L is high enough
and/or r is low enough. With two state variables, the optimal exercise policy is
given by a free boundary (Brock & Rothschild (1986)) characterized by a function
) r ( L
*
t  such that, for a given r at time t, the option should be exercised as soon as
the value of L equals or exceeds this critical value  ) r ( L
*
t . Hence, the decision rule
is: exercise when  ) r ( L L
*
t t  .
11 This optimal exercise condition is ensured by the
smooth-pasting condition (Brock & Rothschild (1986)):
                                                
11 The boundary could equivalently be expressed as  ) r ( L
*
t , such that exercise should occur as
soon as  ) r ( L L
*
t t  .17
t) (r,     )], r ), r ( L ( EPV [
dr
d
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where  ) r ( L
*
t  = critical loan rate for option exercise at time t for a given deposit
rate r.
We can compute the option value V(L,r,t) and the current critical lending rate
) r ( L
*
t  [henceforth written L
*(r)] by solving the system of equations (14)–(21).
Since there is no analytical solution for this system of equations, it has to be
solved numerically. Some numerical results are presented next.
3 Numerical analysis
3.1 Loans-in-place
Differentiating equation (13) with respect to the lending and deposit rates:
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Result 1. The value of a loan-in-place is an increasing function of the loan rate
and a decreasing function of the deposit rate.
This, of course, is not a surprising result. It is intuitively obvious that a higher
loan rate (with deposit rate held constant) will make the loan more attractive,
whereas a higher deposit rate (with loan rate held constant) will make the loan less
attractive to the bank. Although this is not explicitly stated as a theoretical result
in the existing literature, it is implicitly taken for granted, eg, Hancock (1985). In
any event, we have included this result for completeness.18
The exact magnitudes of these effects will of course depend on the parameter
values (,,) used for the computations. The CIR process parameters have been
estimated by various researchers, eg, Sun & Pearson (1989 and 1994), Gibbons &
Ramaswamy (1993), etc. There is a wide variation in the different sets of
estimates. Sun & Pearson (1994), for instance, get the following estimates for the
period 1972–1986:  = 7.4525,  = 0.0264,  = 0.0197, while Gibbons &
Ramaswamy (1993) get the following estimates:  = 12.43,  = 0.0154,  = 0.49.
Moreover, there seems to be a problem with unit roots leading to an over-estimate
of the speed of reversion parameter  (Ball & Torous (1996)). Therefore, rather
than examine the arguments for or against the various sets of parameter estimates,
we decided to start with the following “plausible” parameter values as the base
case (from Ball & Torous (1996)) for the deposit rate:  = 1,  = 0.05, and  =
0.05.
12
The results with these parameter values are displayed in Table 1. With deposit
and loan rates of r = 5% and L = 10% respectively, the value of a loan with 1 year
left to maturity is $0.04877; this value increases with loan maturity, to $0.58201
for a loan with 20 years left.
Since five years is a reasonable term for a bank loan, we look at the results for
a five-year loan to get some idea of the effect of interest rate changes. With r =
5% and L = 10%, the value of a unit 5-year loan is $0.22025. If the deposit rate
were to fall by 1% to 4%, the loan value would increase to $0.23208 (a 5.37%
increase). If, on the other hand, the loan rate L were to increase by 1% to 11%, the
loan value would increase to $0.26438 (a 20.04% increase). We get similar results
for other loan terms and other sets of parameter values. Our simple simulation
results demonstrate.
Result 2. A loan-in-place is generally more sensitive to changes in the loan rate
than in the deposit rate.
When the loan rate increases (deposit rate remaining unchanged) the only effect is
to increase cash inflows, hence the loan value goes up. When the deposit rate r
increases, the cash outflows increase but are discounted harder, which results in a
smaller drop in loan value. Hence the loan value is less sensitive to r than to L.
Again, this result has not been stated formally in the literature, but Hancock
(1985) has presented empirical evidence consistent with this result. She has shown
that bank profits rise more from a 1% increase in the loan rate than a 1% decrease
in the deposit rate (33.66% and 26.46% respectively).
                                                
12 Although the parameter estimates would be slightly different under the risk-neutral measure, the
results are robust to exact values of parameters used, since we get similar results with a wide range
of parameter values.19
Table 1. Valuation of unit loan-in-place
Part A of the table describes the impact of changes in deposit rate (r), loan rate (L), on the
value of a loan-in-place on different loan terms (T). It shows the value (to the bank) of a
T-year loan-in-place of $1. Both the deposit rate and the loan rate have flat term
structures. Part B shows the valuation effect of the deposit rate volatility and Part C
shows the effect of changes in speed reversion on loan values.
A. Effect of changes in short and long rates
(Base case parameter values:  = 1,  = 0.05,  = 0.05)
Value of loan-in-place
r(%) L(%) T = 1 yr T = 5 yrs T = 10 yrs T = 20 yrs
Base case 5 10 0.04877 0.22025 0.38582 0.58201
Change in 4 10 0.05519 0.23208 0.39968 0.59789
Short rate r 6 10 0.04240 0.20853 0.37210 0.56629
Change in 5 9 0.03902 0.17612 0.30793 0.46064
Long rate L 5 11 0.05852 0.26438 0.46372 0.70338
Note: Loan value (i) increases with loan maturity (ii) increases with loan rate L (iii)
decreases with deposit rate r (iv) is more sensitive to changes in L than to changes in r.
B. Effect of changes in short rate volatility    
(r = 5% and L = 10%; T = 5 years, and other parameter values same as above)




Note: Loan value is an increasing function of volatility.
C. Effect of changes in speed of reversion    
(r = 5% and L = 10%; T = 5 years, and other parameter values same as above)




Note: Loan value is a decreasing function of speed of reversion.20
Part B of Table 1 shows the valuation effect of the deposit rate volatility . As 
increases (keeping both the rates unchanged), the loan value increases. This can
be explained intuitively as follows: in good periods (ie, when r is low), bank
profits (L – r) are higher since L is fixed and r is stochastic; these profits are
discounted at a lower rate (since r is low) hence the present value is high.  During
bad periods (high r), the profit will be lower but will be discounted harder (since r
is high). Therefore the bank will be better off (in present value terms, which
determine “loan value”) if r fluctuates more.
Unfortunately, an increase in interest rate volatility is almost always
accompanied by an increase in the interest rate level, hence it is difficult to test the
pure effect of volatility. When both the level and volatility increase, they have
opposing effects on the bank profit, so the net effect might not be significant. In
fact, Flannery (1981 & 1983) reports that interest rate volatility has very little
effect on bank profits.
Part C of Table 1 shows that the loan value is a decreasing function of the
speed of reversion . Increasing  reduces the conditional volatility of the process
(since r will revert back faster to the mean), hence it has the same effect as
reducing the volatility , as a result of which the loan value falls.
3.2 Loans-in-process
A loan-in-process is equivalent to an American call option to grant the loan, and
its value can be computed by solving the system of equations (14)–(21). As no
analytical solution is available, we solved the system numerically using the
explicit method of Schwartz (1977) to discretize the model. We also used the
transformation of variables suggested by Hull & White (1990) to ensure
convergence and stability of the solution, ie, r and L replaced by variables x and y
respectively, where  r 2 x   and  L 2 x  .
The parameters for the deposit rate process are unchanged from the previous
section, ie,  = 1,  = 0.05, and  = 0.05. For the loan rate process, we use the
same value for the speed of adjustment,  = 1; since the loan rate is less volatile
than the deposit rate, we set  = 0.04; also, we set  = 0.10 since the loan rate, on
average, is significantly higher than the deposit rate. Finally, we set the
correlation  = 0.95, approximately equal to the measured correlation between the
3-month CD rate and the prime rate for the period 1980–1996 (Madura (1997)).
The term of the loan (T) is 5 years. The time to expiration of the option to grant21
loan (T
*) was set equal to 1 month.
13 For the base case, we set both deposit and
loan rates at their long-term mean levels ( and  respectively), r = 5% and L =
10%. This means that both rates have a flat term structure. We later repeat all
numerical exercises with upward-sloping (r < , L < ) and downward-sloping
(r > , L > ) term structures.
With these parameter values, we get V(10%, 5%) = $0.23880; that is, the
option to issue a $1 five-year loan when L = 10% and r = 5% is worth $0.23880,
compared to $0.22025 if the loan is granted immediately. We can see that there is
a small premium (8.42%) over the loan value; this is an outcome of the stochastic
nature of deposit and loan rates. It also implies that, with these particular
parameter values, the bank needs a spread somewhat larger than the current 5% in
order to grant the loan.
Part A of Table 2 summarizes the effect on loans-in-process of changing the
loan and deposit rates, L and r, one at a time. Not surprisingly, the value of the
option to lend rises when L increases and falls when r increases. Further, it is
more sensitive to changes in L than in r, consistent with Hancock’s (1985)
finding. The results are summarized below.
Result 3. The value of a loan-in-process is an increasing function of L and a
decreasing function of r, and is more sensitive to changes in L than in r.
This is a new result since nobody has looked at a loan-in-process as an option yet.
The intuition behind the result is as follows. The loan-in-process is an option to
lend (or an option to buy a bond). When L increases, the option is more in-the-
money or less out-of-the-money, hence the call option value rises. When r
increases, the option becomes less in-the-money or more out-of-the-money, and
option value falls. However, r is also the discount rate, and we know that a call
option value is an increasing function of the discount rate. Hence the option value
does not fall as far. As a result, option value is more sensitive to changes in L than
in r.
Part B of Table 2 summarizes the effect on loan-in-process of changing both
L and r by a similar margin, ie, the effect of a spread-preserving shift in interest
rates. If both long and short rates rise by the same margin, the value of the option
to lend rises. This is to be expected from Result 3 since the value is more sensitive
to L than r, and is summarized below.
                                                
13 Informal discussions with bank personnel suggest that the option to lend is considered a short-
term option; one month seems a reasonable “time window” for making a loan decision. However,
the results are not qualitatively sensitive to the value of T
*. The only problem with using a longer
T
* (say 1 year) is that the value of waiting constitutes most of the value of the loan-in-process,
which does not seem very realistic.22
Table 2. Valuation of unit loan-in-process
(option to grant loan)
Part A of the table portrays the effect on loan-in-process due to changes in deposit rate
(r), loan rate (L), on the value of a loan-in-place on different loan terms (T). It shows the
value (to the bank) of the option to grant a unit ($1) 5-year loan. Part B shows the effect
on loan-in-process by changing L and r by a similar margin.
A. Effect of changes in deposit and loan rates
Base case parameter values:  = 1,  = 0.05,  = 0.05,  = 1,  = 0.10,  = 0.04 and  =
0.95; Loan term T = 5 years, Option matures in T
* = 1 month.
r(%) L(%) Value of loan-in-process Change
Change in r 4 10 0.24891 +4.23%
5 10 0.23880 Base case
6 10 0.22906 –4.08%
Change in L 5 9 0.21339 –10.64%
5 10 0.23880 Base case
5 11 0.26621 +11.48%
Note: The value of loan-in-process increases with L and decreases with r, and is more
sensitive to changes in L than to changes in r.
B. Effect of spread-preserving changes in r and L
Parameter values same as above






Note: If the spread between L and r is maintained, rising interest rates result in higher
values of loans-in-place.23
Result 4. The value of a loan-in-process increases (decreases) when both r and L
rise (fall) while maintaining the same spread between the two rates.
Thus the effect of a spread-preserving change in loan and deposit rates on a loan-
in-process is exactly the opposite of than on a loan-in-place. Also, although Result
4 seems to imply that loans-in-process are worth more in a higher interest rate
environment, any such conclusion must be treated with caution. What it says is
that banks are better off only if both deposit and loan rates rise by the same
amount, leaving the spread unchanged. If the two rates do not rise by equal
amounts, the net result will depend on the actual levels by which the loan and
deposit rates rise.
3.3 Comparative static results
In order to establish the robustness of the model’s results and also to derive
comparative static results, we repeated the numerical simulations with a wide
range of parameter values. The comparative static results are illustrated in Figures
1–5 for flat term structure (r = 5%, L = 10%), for upward-sloping term structure
(r =  %, L = 9%), and for downward-sloping term structure (r = 6%, L = 11%).
Effect of Correlation between deposit and loan rates (   ). As Figure 1 shows,
the value of the loan-in-process is a slightly decreasing function of the correlation
 for all three term structure shapes. This is consistent with basic economic
intuition: a higher correlation means that r and L will move more closely in the
future, thus reducing the value of waiting and the option value.
Effect of Deposit and Loan Rate Volatilities (    and    ). As shown in Figures
2 and 3, the value of the loan-in-process is a decreasing function of the deposit
rate volatility () and an increasing function of the loan rate volatility () for all
three term structures. The intuition is as follows. The value of the option to lend
comes from the spread between lending and deposit rates, (L – r). Thus, from
basic option theory, the option value should be an increasing function of the
volatility of (L – r). Since L and r are so highly positively correlated, the standard
deviation of (L  –  r) should be increasing in  (standard deviation of L) and
decreasing in  (standard deviation of r). Therefore, the option value is increasing
in  and decreasing in .
Effect of Speeds of Reversion (    and    ). The value of a loan-in-process is an
increasing function of  for flat and downward-sloping terms structures, but
initially decreasing and then increasing in  for upward-sloping term structures
(Figure 4). Also, it is an increasing function of  for flat and upward-sloping term
structures and a decreasing function of  for downward-sloping term structures
(Figure 5).24
Figures 1. Comparative static results for different term
structure.
Figure 1 shows the value of a unit loan-in-process as a function of the correlation between
deposit and lending rates,  (rho). The following base case parameters were used:  = 1,
 = 0.05,   = 0.05,   = 1,  = 0.04,   = 0.10, and a loan term of 5 years. Three term
structures are considered: flat (r = 5%, L = 10%), downward sloping (r = 6%, L = 11%),
and upward sloping (r = 4%, L = 9%). In all three cases, the value of a loan-in-process is
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Figure 2. Comparative Static results for different term
structure
Figure 2 reports the value of a unit loan-in-process as a function of the volatility of the
deposit rate,  (sigma). The following base case parameters were used:  = 1,  = 0.05,
 = 1,  = 0.04,  = 0.10,  = 0.95, and a loan term of 5 years. Three term structures are
considered: flat (r = 5%, L = 10%), downward sloping (r = 6%, L = 11%), and upward
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Flat Downward-sloping Upward-sloping term structure26
Figure 3. Comparative Static results for different term
structure
Figure 3 reports the value of a unit loan-in-process as a function of the volatility of the
lending rate,  (beta). The following base case parameters were used:  = 1,  = 0.05,
 = 0.05,  = 1,  = 0.10,  = 0.95, and a loan term of 5 years. Three term structures are
considered: flat (r = 5%, L = 10%), downward sloping (r = 6%, L = 11%), and upward
sloping (r  =  4%, L  =  9%). In all three cases, the value of a loan-in-process is an
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Flat Downward-sloping Upward-sloping term structure27
Figure 4. Comparative Static results for different term
structure
Figure 4 reports the value of a unit loan-in-process as a function of the speed of reversion
of the deposit rate,  (kappa). The following base case parameters were used:  = 0.05,
 = 0.05,   = 1,   = 0.10,  = 0.04,   = 0.95, and a loan term of 5 years. Three term
structures are considered: flat (r = 5%, L = 10%), downward sloping (r = 6%, L = 11%),
and upward sloping (r = 4%, L = 9%). The effect of  on the value of a loan-in-process is
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Flat Downward-sloping Upward-sloping term structure28
Figure 5. Comparative Static results for different term
structure
Figure 5 reports the value of a unit loan-in-process as a function of the speed of
reversion of the lending rate,  (gamma). The following base case parameters were
used:  = 1,  = 0.05,  = 0.05,  = 0.10,  = 0.04,  = 0.95, and a loan term of 5
years. Three term structures are considered: flat (r = 5%, L = 10%), downward
sloping (r = 6%, L = 11%), and upward sloping (r = 4%, L = 9%). The effect of 
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4 The main results
4.1 Overall effects of interest rate changes: theoretical
results
We have seen how interest rate changes affect loans-in-place and loans-in-process
separately. When interest (both loan and deposit) rates rise by the same amount,
the value of a loan-in-place falls while that of a loan-in-process rises. Clearly, the
overall effect of higher rates will depend on the ratio of loans-in-place and loans-
in-process, since the two effects are in opposite directions. The smaller the bank’s
lending slack (or the closer the bank to its lending limit), the smaller the influence
of loans-in-process. Therefore, such banks should be hurt by a spread-preserving
increase in interest rates. As the bank moves away from its lending limit, loans-in-
process become relatively more important, and the bank will be less negatively
affected by a spread-preserving increase in interest rates. Therefore, banks with
large lending slack should be less sensitive to interest rate changes.
The ratio of loans-in-place to loans-in-process is thus an important factor in
determining the overall interest rate risk. This ratio is related to the bank’s capital
base by regulatory restrictions. Because of capital adequacy requirements, banks
are able to increase the size of their loan portfolios only up to a certain limit, for a
given level of equity.
14 This sets an implicit upper limit on the amount a bank can
lend. If it lends more than this critical upper limit, it will be labeled “under-
capitalized” and subject to disciplinary measures (“prompt corrective action”,
Saunders (1994), p. 324) by regulating bodies.
We present below some numerical illustrations to demonstrate quantitatively
how interest rate changes might affect the overall value of a bank, and how this
effect is related to the bank’s lending slack. As a starting point, let us assume that
the bank can make loans totaling $100; this ceiling results from the capital
adequacy requirement mentioned above. If it already has $100 of loans-in-place, it
can make no more loans (ie, has no lending slack), hence all the value comes from
loans-in-place. If it has loans-in-place of less than $100, it can potentially make
more loans, hence a part of its value comes from loans-in-process. Table 3 shows
the results for various scenarios, using the base case parameter values of
Section 3.
                                                
14 The capital adequacy requirement generally looks like the following: Capital/Assets  some
critical percentage, where the numerator and denominator can be defined more specifically
depending on the context, eg, Capital/Assets ratio (Tier 1) or Total-Risk-based Capital Ratio. The
equity goes into the numerator, and the value of the loan portfolio in the denominator. It is clear
that, with a given level of equity, there is an upper limit on the amount of loans that can be made.30
Table 3. Net effect of interest rate changes
This table shows the effects of spread-preserving changes in interest rates on the overall
value of a bank, for different weights of loans-in-place and loans-in-process.  Deposit rate
is (r), loan rate is (L), loan term is (T). The loan-in-place capacity ranges from $100–$50.
Parameter values:  = 1,  = 0.05,  = 0.05,  = 1,  = 0.10,  = 0.04 and  = 0.95; Loan
term T = 5 years, Option matures in T
* = 1 month.
1. Loans-in-place $100, loans-in-process $0 (at lending limit)
Rate movement (%) r(%) L(%) Total value ($) Change in value (%)
Base case 5 10 22.025
Up 6 11 20.853 –5.32
Down 4 9 23.208 +5.37
2. Loans-in-place $90, loans-in-process $10
Rate movement (%) r(%) L(%) Total value ($) Change in value (%)
Base case 5 10 22.211
Up 6 11 21.305 –4.08
Down 4 9 23.116 +4.07
3. Loans-in-place $80, loans-in-process $20
Rate movement (%) r(%) L(%) Total value ($) Change in value (%)
Base case 5 10 22.396
Up 6 11 21.757 –2.85
Down 4 9 23.023 +2.80
4. Loans-in-place $70, loans-in-process $30
Rate movement (%) r(%) L(%) Total value ($) Change in value (%)
Base case 5 10 22.582
Up 6 11 22.209 –1.65
Down 4 9 22.931 +1.55
5. Loans-in-place $50, loans-in-process $50
Rate movement (%) r(%) L(%) Total value ($) Change in value (%)
Base case 5 10 22.953
Up 6 11 23.113 +0.70
Down 4 9 22.746 –0.90
Note: Sensitivity of total bank value to interest rate changes is found to decrease as the
bank moves away from its lending limit. Indeed, if the bank is very far from the lending
limit (eg, 50% slack), higher interest rates will result in higher overall bank value.31
Looking first at a bank that has no lending slack (in this case, $100 in loans-in-
place and $0 in loans-in-process), we see that (i) it is very sensitive to interest rate
changes, and (ii) it is hurt by an increase and helped by a decrease in interest rates.
An increase of 1% in both the deposit and lending rates will reduce value by
5.32% whereas a 1% fall in rates will increase value by 5.37%.
If the bank had instead utilized 90% of its lending capacity (had a 10%
lending slack; that is, $90 of loans-in-place and $10 of loans-in-process),
15 its
interest rate sensitivity would decline substantially. In this case, a 1% increase
(decrease) in both deposit and lending rates would reduce (increase) bank value
by 4.08% (4.07%). As the lending slack is increased, the bank becomes less
sensitive to interest rate changes; interest rate sensitivity falls to 1.65% (1.55%)
when the slack is 30%. Indeed, with a lending slack of 50%, the interest rate
sensitivity is reversed; for a 1% increase (decrease) in both rates, the bank value
actually rises (falls) by 0.70% (0.90%). These numbers illustrate the main
argument of this article, which is summarized in
Result 5. The net effect of interest rate changes on a bank’s value depends on its
lending slack. If the slack is very small, the bank will be very sensitive (and
negatively affected when interest rates rise). As the slack is increased, the effect
becomes weaker; and for sufficiently large slack, the effect of higher interest rates
can even be positive.
This follows from Results 1 and 4, and is the most important result of the paper. It
relates, for the first time, a bank’s interest rate sensitivity to its lending position
and how close it is to its lending limit. If a bank has sufficient lending slack, it
could behave as if its asset and liability maturities have been matched. This
suggests a possible explanation for Flannery & James’s (1984b) finding that the
“effective maturity” of demand, savings and small time deposits was longer than
their very short contractual maturity.
The effect of lending slack on a bank’s interest rate risk is illustrated in Figure
6 for the base case parameter values, under four scenarios: (i) without the option
feature (ie, there is no option to lend), (ii) for a flat term structure (r  =  5%,
L = 10%), (iii) for an upward-sloping term structure (r = 4%, L = 9%), and (iv) for
a downward-sloping term structure (r  =  6%, L  =  11%). It is clear that, in the
absence of an option-like feature in the bank’s loan decisions, the lending slack
will have no impact on interest rate risk. Since the existing banking literature has
not looked at the option aspect, this link between interest rate risk and lending
                                                
15 Most banks would probably not have too much excess capital, since it is expensive. However, as
loans mature over time, it provides banks with significant slack in their lending capacity. If
conditions are not favorable, a maturing loan might be replaced with an investment in short-term
government securities. Thus, it is common for banks to have some unutilized lending capacity.32
slack has been ignored to date. With the option feature, however, the bank’s
interest rate risk is decreasing in its lending slack for all three term structures. For
a downward-sloping term structure, a lending slack slightly below 30% virtually
eliminates all interest rate risk, and for the other cases a lending slack of 40–45%
eliminates interest rate risk.
Figure 6.
Figure 6 describes the effect of lending slack on a bank’s interest rate risk for the base
parameters under different scenarios. It traces the change in bank value resulting from a
1% rise in interest rates, as a function of the bank’s lending slack. Lending slack is
defined as [1 – proportion of lending capacity in loans-in-place]  100%. The following
base case parameter values were used:  = 1,  = 0.05,  = 0.05,  = 1,  = 0.10,  = 0.04,
 = 0.95, and a loan term of 5 years. Four scenarios are illustrated: (i) bank has no option
to lend and term structure is flat, (ii) bank has option to lend and term structure is flat,
(iii) bank has option to lend and term structure is upward-sloping, and (iv) bank has
option to lend and term structure is downward-sloping. Note that the degree of lending
slack makes no difference in the absence of an option to lend. In the other three scenarios,
the change in bank value is an increasing function of lending slack. Higher interest rates
















































No option feature Flat term structure
Upward sloping term structure Downward sloping term structure33
We note at this point that we made some simplifying assumptions when
developing the model. It might be of interest to ask how the results might change
if some of the assumptions are relaxed. One such assumption was that deposits are
rolled over, and if there is a withdrawal it is replaced right away because there is a
large depositor pool. But if there should be stochastic withdrawals that are not
perfectly replaceable, the bank cannot ask for loan repayment without incurring
significant penalty costs. What the bank can do is to pay off the depositor from its
holdings of T-bills and other liquid security holdings (part of its lending slack).
Thus the cost of the loan would no longer be the deposit rate but rather the
opportunity cost of the liquid investments (which would be close, since both are
short-term rates). Then the valuation of loans-in-place or loans-in-process would
not change much. However, the bank will not be able to use its entire lending
slack to exercise options to lend, because of the uncertainty regarding deposit
withdrawal and replacement. Thus the effective lending slack will now be smaller,
as a result of which the positive effect of loans-in-process will be diluted
somewhat. This will weaken Result 5 of the paper. Also, the bank could, in
principle, issue equity to cover the deposit withdrawals, but in practice it would be
very difficult (because of the time requirements) and prohibitively expensive
(high cost of equity and large issue costs).
Also, while we have discussed banks’ lending capacity, we have not explicitly
modeled the lending capacity or its determinants. For instance, if there is a loss of
charter value upon default (arising from excess lending capacity), it will reduce
the bank’s lending capacity and slack. Although the valuation of loans-in-place
and loans-in-process will not be different, Result 5 will be weakened because the
importance of loans-in-process will be diluted, and the bank’s overall interest rate
risk will now be somewhat higher. Incorporating a formal capital requirement
would introduce additional complexity to the model. To illustrate, if we specify a
capital requirement of 5%, the bank’s lending capacity will be 20E, where E is the
equity value; and the lending slack will be (1 – loans/20E). When interest rates
increase, equity value E generally falls, unless the slack is very large (as we have
shown). If E falls, the slack also falls, from the above expression; and this will
weaken Result 5 since loans-in-process will become less important. However, if
the slack is large enough, E will rise and the slack will rise even more, thus
strengthening Result 5. The effects will be exactly the opposite when interest rates
fall. Therefore, including a capital requirement might weaken or strengthen our
main result, depending on the situation.34
4.2 Empirical implications and evidence
Result 5 and the accompanying discussion generates the following
Empirical Implication: Banks with considerable lending slack (banks far from
their lending limits imposed by capital requirements) will have lower levels of
interest rate risk than banks with little lending slack.
The importance of this empirical hypothesis comes from the fact that in the
existing banking literature there has been no effort to separate low-slack and high-
slack banks when testing for interest rate risk. This might have contributed to the
absence of any conclusive findings (discussed in Section 1). As discussed below,
empirical evidence indicates that low-slack banks are indeed significantly more
(negatively) affected by higher interest rates than are high-slack banks.
Following the models used by U.S. saving and loans (S&L) and bank
regulators in calculating interest rate risk (IRR),
16 we investigate the valuation
impact of interest rate increase on different asset-liability and off-balance sheet
items of approximately 1400 S&L institutions during the fourth quarters of 1993
and 1994 (1993Q4 and 1994Q4 respectively). Additionally, we analyze the
sample data by groups based on their respective lending positions compared to
their total potential or lending capacity (ie, based on their lending slack).
Descriptive statistics of key balance sheet variables (Appendix 3) reveal that
the sample financial institutions held around 80% of their assets (on average) in
loans-in-place, keeping about 20% of their capacity in loan-in-process.
17 Table 4
shows the impact of a 200-basis-point increase in interest rate on potential NPV
changes in total assets, total liabilities, and total off-balance-sheet activities of
sample institutions.
                                                
16 For details on the estimation techniques and procedure followed here, see Appendix 2.
17 In general, our separate estimates for 1993Q4 and 199Q4 provide evidence very similar to
pooled estimates from the combined sample. The minor differences between the two are likely to
be due to the changes in the thrift portfolio as well as changes in interest rates. Similar evidence is
also obtained if we use the BA approach. Under the BA approach, assets were categorized as
amortizing assets, non-amortizing assets, and deep-discounting assets. The BA estimation results
are not reported here but are available upon request.35
Table 4. Change in NPV for a 200 basis point increase in
interest rates ($ billions)
The table describes the impact of interest rate change (a 200 basis point increase in
interest rate in this case) on the change of Net Present Value of different asset, liability
and off-balance sheet activities undertaken by the sample banking institutions. Asset
categories include adjustable rate and fixed rate mortgages, Mortgage servicing assets and
mortgage derivatives (IOs, POs, CMOs), other mortgages, non-mortgage loans such as
consumer and commercial loans. Liability item categories include retail or core deposits
consists of savings and demand deposits; time deposits; and borrowings and regulatory
advances. All relevant and available off-balance sheet activities are combined into one





Adjustable rate mortgages –5.73 –4.98
Fixed-rate mortgages –12.32 –11.21
IOs, POs, CMOs, REMIC tranches etc. –1.40 –2.02
Other mortgages and second mortgages –3.46 –4.05
Consumer and commercial loans –1.53 –1.98
Investment securities, equity securities, zero-coupon securities,
and debt securities –1.04 –0.98
Rated below investment grade
Liquid and other assets 0.29 0.43
TOTAL ASSETS OF THE SAMPLE –25.19 –24.79
Core deposits –9.23 –8.48
Fixed maturity deposits (interest bearing) –6.85 –7.36
Advances and borrowing –3.54 –2.65
TOTAL LIABILITIES –19.62 –18.49
Impact of off-balance sheet activities 0.88 1.07
TOTAL CHANGE IN NET PRESENT VALUE –4.69 –5.23
Note: Estimation followed OTS approach
In 1993Q4, the interest rate shock resulted in a decline in the value of balance
sheet and off-balance sheet activities of sample institutions by $4.69 billion. A
similar decline of $5.23 billion is observed in 1994Q4. In asset categories, the
interest rate increase caused larger declines in asset items that can be categorized
as “loans-in-place” (items listed in the first 5 rows). Indeed, these five items
account for over 97% of the total asset value decline (in both samples), although
they constitute only about 80% of the total assets. The impact on assets that can be
categorized as “loan-in-process” (rows 6 and 7) is much smaller at 2–3% of the
total decline, even though these items constitute about 20% of the assets. Also, the
Other Asset category (item 7) produced a small but positive change in NPV.
These findings are consistent with the major implication of our paper, that the
impact of interest rate changes on loans-in-place will be very different from the
impact on loans-in-process.36
We also compared the overall effect of interest rate changes on “high-slack”
and “other” institutions. As mentioned earlier, almost 20 percent of the assets on
average could be categorized as loan-in-process. The standard deviation for these
items was found to be $6.3 billion. In order to form two distinct groups of
financial institutions differentiated by their lending slack, we identified all the
institutions with loans-in-process more than two standard deviations above the
mean. This group was defined as the “Slack Group”. The rest of the institutions
were put in the “Other Group”.  We then had two groups of financial institutions,
one with substantial lending slack and the other with less slack. Table 5 illustrates
the difference between the two categories.
Table 5. Change in NPV For a 200 Basis Point Increase in
Interest Rates ($ Billions)
Comparison of the impacts of interest rate change between “Slack group” (institutions
under this category have relatively higher loan-in-process, at least by two standard
deviation above the average loan-in process of sample institutions) and “other group”
(institutions that are not in the “slack” category).
“slack group” “other group”
Total change in NPV (1993Q4) –1.54 –8.79
Total change in NPV (1994Q4) –1.06 –9.03
Note: in both cases, the differences are statistically significant at all levels.
We find 55 thrifts in 1993Q4 and 62 thrifts in 1994Q4 that fall in the “slack”
group. The table reports the total change in NPV resulting from a 200-basis-point
increase in interest rate, for each category.
18 In 1993Q4, the change in NPV for
the “substantial slack” group was a decline of $1.54 billion; however, this number
was significantly lower than the $8.79 billion decline for the other group. A
similar result is seen for 1994Q4, when the total decline for the “substantial slack”
group was found to be $1.06 billion compared to a decline of $9.23 billion for the
other group. In both cases, the difference is statistically significant at all levels.
This evidence provides further support for the implications of Result 5.
Overall, the evidence indicates that an increase in interest rates generally has a
significant negative effect on asset items categorized as “existing loans,” and a
substantially smaller effect on items categorized as “loans-in-process”. Moreover,
institutions with more slack in loan capacity (ie, farther from the lending limit)
were found to be significantly less sensitive to interest rate changes than
institutions closer to their lending limits.
                                                
18 A detailed estimate by asset/liability categories and off-balance-sheet activities produced results
very similar to Table 5.37
4.3 The critical lending rate L
*(r) and credit availability
19
In Section 2 we had briefly discussed the critical lending rate L
*(r), ie, the lending
rate at which the bank will optimally grant the loan (exercise the option to lend),
for a given deposit rate r. There is a large body of work on stopping times, optimal
exercise policies and critical exercise triggers in the options literature (Barone-
Adesi and Whaley (1987), Brock & Rothschild (1984), and others). There is also a
large body of work on credit availability and rationing in the banking literature
(Berger & Udell (1992), Shrieves & Dahl (1995), and others). However, to our
knowledge, the role of the option aspect and critical exercise trigger in banking
(credit availability) has not been investigated yet. Here we carry out a preliminary
investigation into this issue.
Since L
*(r) is the lending rate at which the bank is willing to grant the loan, a
higher L
*(r) means banks will be less willing to grant loans, and a lower L
*(r)
means banks will be more willing to grant loans. Since this reasoning applies to
all banks, any factor that decreases L
*(r) will result in an expansion of loans
granted (ie, credit availability will rise) and any factor that increases L
*(r) will
reduce credit availability. In fact, if L
*(r) rises high enough, it might lead to credit
rationing.
This would seem to suggest that all banks make the “loan/no-loan” decision
simultaneously, since our model has no inter-bank differences. It results from our
assumption that all banks face the same deposit and loan rate processes. In real
life, there would be some differences between banks, and all banks might not
behave in an identical manner. However, the overall behavior of the banking
sector is not entirely inconsistent with the notion of most banks behaving in a
similar fashion. It has been noticed that most banks behave in a similar manner in
extending or refusing loans, which is why credit availability from the banking
sector as a whole goes through sharp expansions and contractions (Shrieves &
Dahl (1995)).
We first look at the behavior of L
*(r) with respect to r. When the deposit rate
increases, we would expect the critical lending rate L
*(r) to also go up, since the
cost of a loan is now higher. Intuitively, therefore, L
*(r) should be an increasing
function of r. Unfortunately, L
*(r) has to be determined numerically, and it is not
possible to sign dL
*(r)/dr analytically. We therefore determine L
* numerically for
different values of r, and the results are displayed in Figure 7 for the base case
parameter values used in Section 3.
                                                
19 We thank the referee for recommending the addition of this section to the paper.38
Figure 7.
Figure 7 describes critical loan rate L
*(r) and critical spread [L
*(r)–r] as functions of
deposit rate r. The following base case parameter values were used:  = 1,  = 0.05,
 = 0.05,  = 1,  = 0.10,  = 0.04,  = 0.95, and a loan term of 5 years. Note that the
critical lending rate is an increasing function of r, but the critical spread is a decreasing
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L
*(r) is indeed an increasing function of r, as expected from the above discussion.
We also note that the spread required to grant a loan [L
*(r)–r] is a decreasing
function of r. This is an outcome of the mean-reverting nature of interest rates. If r
is very low, it is expected to bounce back up because of mean reversion. But if a
loan is granted, the loan rate does not change. Hence the bank is hesitant to grant
the loan, unless the spread is large. This results in a larger critical spread for low r
(upward-sloping term structure). The opposite is true when r is very high
(downward-sloping term structure). Because of mean reversion, r is expected to
fall, hence the bank is more willing to make the loan, ie, the critical spread
[L
*(r)–r] is lower. In fact, if the term structure is sufficiently inverted (here, for
r  12.5%) the spread is negative; that is, the bank is willing to lend at a rate lower39
than the deposit rate, which we know from anecdotal evidence is observed when
the term structure is sufficiently downward-sloping.
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Table 6. Comparative static results for the critical loan rate
L*(r)
Describes comparative static results showing determinants of the critical loan rate L
*(r)
using different parameter values. Base case parameter values:  = 1,  = 0.05,  = 0.05,
 = 1,  = 0.10,  = 0.04 and  = 0.95; r = 5%, loan term T = 5 years, and option matures
in T
* = 1 month.

































                                                
20 Note that in Figure 7 the curves are not very smooth because of the discretization necessitated
by numerical solution of the differential equation.40
Determinants of L
*(r). The critical loan rate L
*(r) was numerically determined
for a wide range of parameter values, and the results are summarized in Table 6.
L
*(r) is found to a decreasing function of ,  and , and an increasing function of
 and . The effect of  was captured intuitively by Santomero (1984), who wrote
“… higher covariance reduces uncertainty around expected profits and encourages
intermediation activity.” Pyle (1971) had earlier made a similar prediction about
the role of correlation in a somewhat different setting.
Since a higher (lower) L
*(r) implies decreased (increased) credit availability,
the comparative static results in Table 6 suggest the following
Empirical Implication: Credit availability from the banking sector should be
increasing in ,  and , and decreasing in  and .
Empirical test on credit availability. To test for the relationship between the
above parameters and credit availability, we gathered quarterly data on aggregate
loans granted by the banking sector, as a proxy for credit availability (source:
Historical Data, Federal Reserve Board) and 3-month CD rates and prime rates
(proxies for deposit and lending rates respectively, source: Madura (1997)). We
next estimated the correlation series () by computing a running 20-period
correlation between the two rates, and the deposit and lending rate volatilities (
and  ) by computing a running 20-period volatility for each series.
21 The
estimates are shown in part A of Table 7.
We then ran a regression with the aggregate loans as the dependent variable
and the previous quarter’s ,  and  as the explanatory variables (we ignored the
speeds of reversion  and  which are difficult to estimate because of data
limitations), ie,
            
~ BETA SIGMA RHO AGGLOAN 1 t 3 1 t 2 1 t 1 0 t
where AGGLOAN is aggregate loans, and RHO, SIGMA and BETA are the
parameters  ,   and . From the above empirical hypothesis, the expected
coefficient signs are positive for 1 and 2, and negative for 3. The regression
results are summarized in part B of Table 7. As predicted, the coefficients of RHO
and SIGMA are positive and significant, while the coefficient of BETA is
negative and significant. The adjusted R-squared statistic is 75.89%, and
F-statistic is 46.15 (significance level of 1.213 E–13). Therefore, although this is a
                                                
21 We used both 20 periods and 10 periods of quarterly data for computing the correlations and
volatilities. The results are not sensitive to the exact number of data points used for the estimation.41
simple test limited to only three explanatory variables, the regression results are
quite consistent with the predictions of the model.
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Table 7. Credit availability and the option approach
A. Parameter estimates and aggregate loans
This table shows aggregate loans made by the banking sector, by quarter, from 1985 to
1996. It also shows, by quarter, the correlation between the 3-month CD rate and the
prime rate, the volatility of the 3-month CD rate, and the volatility of the prime rate. The







1984 4 1326.9 0.97913812 0.030642083 0.034031952
1985 1 1361.6 0.98009992 0.03183423 0.035029844
2 1394.7 0.98123599 0.031163472 0.033401785
3 1425.6 0.98399612 0.031742952 0.034392332
4 1466.3 0.98904969 0.032580935 0.035624365
1986 1 1509.5 0.98743005 0.030316959 0.032925922
2 1521.7 0.98697202 0.029983892 0.032547373
3 1551.4 0.98252 0.025799781 0.028130651
4 1596.5 0.98036724 0.023848078 0.025187925
1987 1 1635.2 0.97875492 0.022932654 0.024326331
2 1668.4 0.97073901 0.019576045 0.021478508
3 1703 0.95817435 0.016275176 0.01719374
4 1720.2 0.96262369 0.01599878 0.016336208
1988 1 1761 0.97400762 0.016225973 0.016259743
2 1810.2 0.97462334 0.016374636 0.016418548
3 1838.3 0.97781876 0.015990302 0.016329579
4 1872.6 0.97709759 0.015754561 0.016040488
1989 1 1914.1 0.97504977 0.015648887 0.015846298
2 1948 0.97412024 0.015278523 0.015534053
3 1996.7 0.96449539 0.01277603 0.013715964
4 2019.2 0.95540285 0.011357997 0.011873388
1990 1 2043.8 0.96432118 0.011362913 0.011641056
2 2068.6 0.96531761 0.01133575 0.011423589
3 2100.7 0.96549283 0.011387319 0.011527472
4 2116.4 0.96466092 0.011414408 0.011624768
1991 1 2123.3 0.95646852 0.01145547 0.011626353
2 2118 0.93428275 0.011766943 0.011593619
3 2105.3 0.92512708 0.012009403 0.011434707
4 2110.5 0.91512024 0.012328669 0.011054763
continued on the next page …
                                                
22 This type of analysis does not go into the economic fundamentals, eg, why do the parameters
change over time in a certain way? In addition, there are several possible reasons for a reduction in
loans, eg, recession, decline in bank capital, tightened federal guidelines on certain types of loans,








1992 1 2119.8 0.93544721 0.014169406 0.012126847
2 2110 0.95766229 0.016045937 0.013256747
3 2109.1 0.97029047 0.018307307 0.015009818
4 2113 0.98188847 0.020143381 0.016593971
1993 1 2115.2 0.98501131 0.021810844 0.017906041
2 2146.6 0.98873814 0.023279641 0.019016129
3 2166.4 0.99212732 0.024214569 0.019921331
4 2196.9 0.99292277 0.024639295 0.020422807
1994 1 2220.3 0.99453303 0.024288842 0.02044367
2 2249.5 0.99362092 0.022461279 0.019174712
3 2313.5 0.9933417 0.021110169 0.017788236
4 2378.2 0.99200299 0.019611935 0.016542637
1995 1 2448.2 0.99101459 0.018473121 0.015611712
2 2530.2 0.98907572 0.016879651 0.014912879
3 2585.5 0.98504253 0.015275794 0.014048648
4 2617.1 0.98363217 0.013438612 0.013069627
1996 1 2656.2 0.97934684 0.012223673 0.012347491
2 2689.7 0.97828102 0.011870143 0.011901874
3 2730.8 0.97832103 0.011622184 0.01177475
4 2779.3 0.97839515 0.011653082 0.011874204
B. Regression results
This table shows the results of the regression
            
~ BETA SIGMA RHO AGGLOAN 1 t 3 1 t 2 1 t 1 0 t
where the dependent variable AGGLOAN denotes aggregate loans, RHO is the estimated
correlation between the 3-month CD rate and the prime rate, and SIGMA and BETA are
the estimated volatilities of the 3-month CD rate and the prime rate respectively. The
explanatory variables RHO, SIGMA and BETA are proxies for the parameters ,  and 
of the model. All three explanatory variables have the predicted signs and are significant.
Independent variable Expected sign Coefficient t-static p-value
INTERCEPT –5782.98 –3.10 0.0034
RHO + 8816.09 4.45 0.0001
SIGMA + 28804.84 1.76 0.0854




Significance (F-stat) = 1.213 E–1343
5 Conclusion
Interest rate risk is very important for financial institutions, in light of their
maturity intermediation function. This paper proposes a way of analyzing the
interest rate sensitivity of a bank, explicitly taking into account the contribution of
potential loans to the value of the bank. Based on the mismatch of asset and
liability maturities, the revenue and cost streams depend on the stochastic long-
term (lending) and short-term (deposit) rates in a partial equilibrium setting,
where the two rates are possibly correlated. We also examine separately the effect
on existing loans (loans-in-place) and potential loans (loans-in-process), and show
that the latter can be valued using option pricing theory.
The major contribution of the paper is to show that a bank’s interest rate
sensitivity depends on how close it is to its lending limit imposed by capital
requirement regulations. A bank that is close to its lending limit (has very little
lending slack) will be very sensitive to interest rate changes, while a bank with
substantial lending slack will be less sensitive. In fact, if the slack is large enough,
it might even be helped by higher interest rates. This might be a reason for the
inability of empirical studies to reach a unanimous conclusion regarding interest
rate sensitivity of banks. The empirical evidence presented in this paper indicates
that loans-in-place are more sensitive to interest arte changes than loans-in-
process. Also, financial institutions that have more lending slack are less sensitive
to interest rate changes.
An additional prediction from the option-like feature of the model is that
credit availability from the banking sector should be affected by the parameters of
the lending and deposit rate processes. This prediction is also supported by an
empirical test carried out with quarterly data.44
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Appendix 1.
Theoretical framework
We look at a unit loan (a $1 loan), following the tradition of the “real options”
literature (Dixit & Pindyck (1994), McDonald & Siegel (1986), etc).  At time t,
the bank can make a unit T-period loan at a rate of Lt. The loan is financed by a
unit deposit, which matures instantaneously (very short-term) and is continuously
rolled over, and has a rate rt. Both the loan and deposit rates are market-
determined, and the bank has no control over them. The bank’s decision at any
point in time is whether to make the loan, given the current values of Lt & rt and
their respective processes (equations (1) and (2) of the paper). The value of the
loan to the bank (at the time of the loan, say at time t) is given by EPV(Lt, rt)
(equation (12) of the paper):
e A(T) + 1 ds e A(s) L = ) r , L EPV(




t t     (A1)
If the loan has a positive (negative) value to the bank, it will result in a higher
(lower) stock price when the loan is granted. The loan’s value today (at time t = 0)
is E0{EPV(Lt, rt)D0(t)}, where D0(t) = value at time 0 of $1 to be received at time
t (ie, the current value of a unit discount bond maturing at time t), and E0 is the
expectations operator. The bank’s objective therefore is to time the loan so as to
maximize E0{EPV(Lt, rt)D0(t)}. Let the maximum be given by V(L0, r0, 0). Then:
(t)] D ) r , L [EPV( Max = ,0) r , L V( 0 t t
t
0 0 (A2)
where EPV(Lt, rt) and D0(t) are given by equations (12) and (6) respectively of the
paper. V(Lt, rt, t) is the value function.
Suppose that over the next instant dt, the loan is not granted. Then the change
in the value function will be (using Ito’s lemma):




LL r L t       (A3)
the expected value of which is (substituting for dL and dr from equations (1) and
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Therefore, at the next instant, the expected value of not granting the loan will be
V + E(dV). The present value of this is
rdt) E(dV)](1 [V+ e E(dV)] [V+
rdt  
 (A5)
using the approximation exp(–r dt) 	 (1 – r dt), ignoring higher powers of dt since
it is very small.
However, by not granting the loan, the bank is giving up the cash flow
(L  –  r)dt ie, the spread it would have made from the loan. Therefore, the net
expected present value of waiting is given by
dt ) r (L E(dV) rVdt+ V = dt r) (L rdt) E(dV)](1 [V+       (A6)
(since dV dt = 0). This is the value if the bank does not grant the loan
immediately. If it grants the loan immediately, the value will be EPV(L,r), given
by equation (5) of the paper. Being a value-maximizer, the bank will choose that
course of action which will result in the higher value, ie,
r)] EPV(L,   dt, r) (L E(dV) rVdt+ Max[V = t) r, V(L,    (A7)
If EPV(L,r) < V – rVdt + E(dV) – (L–r)dt, the bank should not exercise the
option, ie, should not grant the loan. Rather, it should postpone its decision; from
the above equation, we have V = V – rVdt + E(dV) – (L–r) dt, or E(dV) – rdt –
(L–r)dt = 0. But if EPV(L,r) > V – rVdt + E(dV) – (L–r)dt, it should grant the loan
immediately, so that V(L,r,t) = EPV(L,r).
This gives the following conditions:
1) For all (L,r) where it is optimal to postpone, we have the partial differential
equation:
r L   =   rV     V r) ( + V L) ( +

















r) EPV(L,   >   t) r, V(L, (A9)
2) When it is optimal to grant the loan, we have:
V(L,r,t) = EPV(L,r) (A10)
and
0   < r  L rV V r) ( +
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(A11)
In this setting, choosing a value of t to maximize E0{EPV(Lt, rt)D0(t)} is
isomorphic to choosing an optimal boundary  ) r ( L
*
t  such that as soon as L reaches
) r ( L
*
t , the loan should be granted (see McDonald & Siegel (1986)).
As long as it is optimal to defer the decision, the above partial differential
equation (14) must be satisfied by the function V(L,r,t). When is it optimal to
grant the loan? Or, how do we compute the optimal  ) r ( L
*
t  for each r and t? For
this, we need the smooth-pasting condition (equation (20) of the paper).
The above argument establishes the theoretical framework for the option
approach, and also the equivalence between value maximization and optimal
timing of loans.51
Appendix 2.
Interest rate risk measure
Over the years, the two approaches to measuring interest-rate risk (IRR), the OTS
(Office of Thrift Supervision) approach and the BA (Federal Banking Agencies,
ie, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of the Comptroller of Currency,
and the Federal Reserve Board) approach, have differed greatly. The OTS
approach incorporates each institution’s weighted average coupons (WACs),
weighted average remaining maturities (WARMs), and other issues needed to
calculate changes in net present values (NPVs) for different categories of assets,
liabilities and off-balance sheet positions (see OTS (1990 & 1993)). This measure
tells how interest-rate “shocks” are evaluated as to their effects on each
institution’s overall portfolio. The regulators decide on possible Capital charges
(Risk-based capital requirement) on these NPV changes.
In contrast, the BAs follow the Bank of International Settlement’s risk-based
capital guidelines for assessing capital charges for IRR [for more details, see
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPR)]. The BAs’ method applies four types of
interest-rate “risk weights” to all banks, based on measures of industry average
durations, and assumes that IRR can be measured by summing up these changes
in values. Cordell, Gordon, and Anderson (1993) report the superiority of OTS
model over the BA model. We have attempted both approaches in measuring the
IRR for our sample institutions and the results overall were found to be quite
similar, hence only the OTS-based results are reported. We used 1993Q4 and
1994Q4 samples of all savings and loan institutions reporting to the OTS. The
sample period had experienced substantial interest rate changes thus helpful for
our purposes. Our method closely follows the directives and procedures used by
Cordell, Gordon, and Anderson (1993).
According to both of these models, Risk is defined as the calculated decline in
value of an institution for a 200 basis point (bp) parallel upward shift in the yield
curve. Decline in value is measured in the OTS model by the decline in net
portfolio value (NPV), which equals the market value of assets minus market
value of liabilities plus market value of off-balance sheet positions, in each
interest rate scenario. In the BA approach, the decline in value is measured by
adding the amount entered into each maturity band times the respective “risk
weight”.
We used information from the Consolidated Maturity and Rate Schedule
(Schedule CMR) of the Thrift Financial Report for 1993Q4 (1,388) and 1994Q4
(1,408), for a total of 2,796 thrifts, to estimate IRR.  Our reporting here is based
on the OTS’s Net Portfolio Value model that estimates discounted present values
for assets, liabilities, and off-balance sheet items for each thrift’s portfolio using52
interest rates prevailing at the end of each quarter. The IRR is the net decline in
assets less liabilities plus off-balance sheet items associated with either a + or –
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where 
NPVA = change in net portfolio value of assets valued at + or – 200 bp
yield curve shifts, 
NPVL = change in net portfolio value of liabilities valued at +
or – 200 bp yield curve shifts, and 
NPVOB = change in net portfolio value of
off-balance sheet items valued at + or – 200 bp shifts.
We subtracted 2% as the Capital is assessed (in deciding risk based capital
standards) against the decline in value exceeding two percent of assets. Our
results are strikingly similar when we do not incorporate this 2 percent in the
equation. The BAs use two alternative measures of risk in their NPR. In the first,
they measure IRR as the decline in net risk weighted positions (NRWPs) of assets
less liabilities plus off-balance sheet items associated with a + or – 100 bp parallel
yield-curve shift, whichever shift produces the greater decline. The  functional
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where Dij = duration risk weight for asset j in time b and i, BAij = book value of
asset group j in time band i, DLi = duration risk weight for liabilities in time band
i, BLi = book value of liabilities in time band i, NOBij = notional amount of off-
balance-sheet item j in time band i, and TBA = total book value of assets.
In the second alternative, a + or – 200bp yield-curve shift is considered,
whichever produces the greater decline, with capital assigned against the decline
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[1 percent was subtracted as Capital is assessed against the decline in net risk
weighted positions for the amount over 1 percent]














where PV = present value of instrument, CF = estimated cash flows including
constant assumptions on options, im = implied zero-coupon
Treasury rate, and s = a residual representing the constant spread
over the zero-coupon Treasury rate for the instrument.
[Used for: Consumer and Commercial Loans, other Non-mortgage Assets,
Investment securities, Deposits and Borrowings, Second Mortgages, and Multi-















where OAS = a residual that equates the average of the prices from 200 interest
rate paths to the current market price of a comparable security.
Five Steps to Calculating Net Present Values under OAS approach:
Generate 200 interest rate paths over 360-month period.
Generate 200 mortgage rate paths over 360-month period.
Generate prepayment rates along 200 paths over 360-month period.
Generate PV, discounting by implied forward rates plus OAS.
Calculate 
Net Present Value at 200 basis points.
[Used for: 1–4 Family Fixed- and Adjustable-rate Mortgages, Mortgage Servicing
Assets, and Mortgage-Derivative Products. Sources: The details on the interest
rate risk measure described above and the  organization of asset-liability
breakdown categories, and estimation methodology used in the paper follows
closely the categories and description of the methods introduced by Cordell,
Gordon, and Anderson (1993), OTS (1990, 1993).]54
Appendix 3.
Balance sheet items of sample thrift institutions
Asset/liability category Amount ($ billions) % of total assets
Adjustable rate mortgages*** 568.8 37.6
Fixed-rate mortgages*** 347.4 20.3
Mortgage servicing assets and derivatives*** 73.5 4.7
Other mortgages and second mortgages** 229.2 13.5
Consumer and commercial loans** 70.4 5.0
Securities (equity securities, zero-coupon
securities, and debt securities)** 151.7 11.3
Other assets** 102.6 7.6
TOTAL ASSETS OF THE SAMPLE 1,542.6 100
Core deposits (savings and demand deposits)** 414.3 31.3
Fixed-maturity deposits (time deposits)** 696.5 52.6
Advances and borrowing** 212.4 16.1
** indicates calculation with static discounted cash flow method.
*** indicates calculation with option-adjusted spread method.
Note: The breakdown of asset-liability items simply follows the breakdown categories
used by the OTS (1990) and (1993) and Cordell, Gordon, and Anderson (1993).BANK OF FINLAND DISCUSSION PAPERS
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